THE EXISTENCE OF SELF-ENFORCING IMPLICIT CONTRACTS.

Item request has been placed! ×
Item request cannot be made. ×
loading   Processing Request
  • Additional Information
    • Subject Terms:
    • Abstract:
      Implicit contracts are nontrivial Nash equilibria to the post-hiring trading game between a worker and the employer. These are supported by intrafirm, rather than labor market, reputations. The existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • Abstract:
      Copyright of Quarterly Journal of Economics is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)