Does the Identity Objection to the future‐like‐ours argument succeed?

ABORTION; ATTITUDE (Psychology); BIOETHICS; ETHICS; LEGAL status of fetuses; GROUP identity; INDIVIDUALITY; LIFE expectancy; PERSONALITY; PSYCHOLOGY; VALUE (Economics); THEORY; ATTITUDES toward abortion

Eric Vogelstein has defended Don Marquis' 'future‐like‐ours' argument for the immorality of abortion against what is known as the Identity Objection, which contends that for a fetus to have a future like ours, it must be numerically identical to an entity like us that possesses valuable experiences some time in the future. On psychological accounts of personal identity, there is no identity relationship between the fetus and the entity with valuable experiences that it will become. Vogelstein maintains that a non‐sentient fetus nonetheless has a future like ours because it is numerically identical with a future organism that has a mind that bears valuable experiences. Skott Brill, drawing on Jeff McMahan's embodied mind account, denies that human organisms directly have experiences, claiming that they only have experiences derivatively by virtue of their thinking part, and the loss of a future like ours is not transferred to the organism. I show that on McMahan's account, a strong case can be made for the organism having experiences directly, and the subject having these experiences derivatively. This negates Brill's reasoning, although it does imply that non‐sentient fetuses do not have a future like ours in quite the same way as we do. I conclude that this is not problematic for Marquis' argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]