Unacknowledged Permissivism.

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  • Author(s): Smith, Julia Jael
  • Source:
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly; Mar2020, Vol. 101 Issue 1, p158-183, 26p
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    • Abstract:
      Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold incompatible attitudes towards some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence. In this paper, I defend a particular version of permissivism – unacknowledged permissivism (UP) – which says that permissivism is true but that no one can ever rationally believe that she is in a permissive case. I show that counter to what virtually all authors who have discussed UP claim, UP is an attractive view: It is compatible with the intuitive motivations for permissivism and avoids a significant challenge to permissivism: the arbitrariness objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • Abstract:
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