TRADE WARS: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts.

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    • Subject Terms:
      FRANCE; ITALY
    • Abstract:
      Three trade wars are examined using variable-sum game theory. The Anglo-Hanse trade wars (1300-1700) are explained as an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma that failed to evolve into cooperation due to transaction costs, rent seeking, and economic recession. The late-19th-century tariff war between France and Italy is a case of an asymmetric trade war that illustrates the danger to a weak country of provoking a trade war with a strong country, with the result that the former is forced to make major concessions. The Hawley-Smoot conflicts of the 1930s are cited as an example of the cooperation-inhibiting effect of publicness in trade negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • Abstract:
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