Sweden and the Scandinavian Defence Dilemma.

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  • Additional Information
    • Subject Terms:
      SCANDINAVIA; UNITED Kingdom; UNITED States; SWEDEN
    • Subject Terms:
      NORTH Atlantic Treaty Organization
    • Abstract:
      Research on Swedish security policy during the Cold War built on primary sources has been growing over the last 20 years. One of the most discussed issues has been ‘neutral’ Sweden's interaction with the West, and especially the United States and the United Kingdom. The newly published documents from the British Foreign Office (FO) in the volume The Nordic Countries: From War to Cold War, 1944–1951 are, against that background, of considerable value. In this article the ‘Scandinavian defence dilemma’ – that is integrating non-aligned Sweden in the Western security system without being a formal member of it – and its solution during the decisive years of 1948–1949 is discussed against the background of the FO documents. The overall picture given is that the British government played a key role in integrating Sweden into the Western defence structures during these years, a picture that harmonizes well with, and further strengthens, current research. It can be argued that the solution of the Scandinavian defence dilemma was the next best solution for all parties involved: the Western powers had preferred Swedish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but Sweden's ‘friendly’ neutrality policy was better than a ‘rigid’ neutrality policy, and the Russians had preferred a Sweden without any ties at all to the West, but as long as Sweden stayed outside NATO the solution was acceptable even for them. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]
    • Abstract:
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