Career Incentives and 'Publish or Perish' in German and U.S. Universities

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  • Additional Information
    • Availability:
      M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, NY 10504. Tel: 800-541-6563; Fax: 914-273-2106; e-mail: [email protected]; Web site: http://www.mesharpe.com
    • Peer Reviewed:
      Y
    • Source:
      27
    • Education Level:
      Higher Education
    • Subject Terms:
      Incentives; Rewards; Public Service; Faculty Promotion; Foreign Countries; College Faculty; Faculty Publishing; Reputation; Productivity; Comparative Analysis; Business Administration Education; Economics; Regression (Statistics)
    • Subject Terms:
      Germany; United States
    • Accession Number:
      10.2753/EUE1056-4934420302
    • ISSN:
      1056-4934
    • Abstract:
      Increasingly, faculty members are rewarded financially for prestige-maximizing publications. As a result, the balance between publishing and other activities such as teaching or public service may collapse, as argued by Leisyte, Enders, and de Boer (2009). In our paper, we focus on career-related rewards and study their impact on publication productivity to see whether economic incentives do indeed affect faculty behavior, as measured empirically. We compare economic incentives resulting from two different career systems, namely those within the German and the U.S. university systems. We derive three hypotheses regarding expected publication patterns and test them by comparing the lifetime publication patterns of German and U.S. business and economics faculty members. (Contains 5 tables, 1 figure and 28 notes.)
    • Abstract:
      As Provided
    • Number of References:
      59
    • Publication Date:
      2010
    • Accession Number:
      EJ898546