Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets.

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  • Author(s): Hummel, Calla
  • Source:
    Latin American Research Review. 2018, Vol. 53 Issue 2, p217-230. 14p.
  • Document Type:
    Article
  • Additional Information
    • Subject Terms:
    • Abstract:
      Many Bolivians engage in corruption through intermediaries, like civil society representatives and lawyers, instead of paying officials directly. People vocally resent that intermediaries add an extra layer of costs and opaqueness to corruption but still choose to pay bribes through intermediaries that knowingly take advantage of them. Why do intermediaries facilitate corruption? While other studies on corrupt intermediaries find that they reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, this study contributes to corruption research by finding that intermediaries engage in cartel-like behavior by disproportionally helping officials and intentionally increasing uncertainty and costs for the average citizen. Ethnographic evidence from street markets in La Paz demonstrates that civil society actors like street vendors' union representatives advance their careers by collecting and delivering bribes to specific bureaucrats. Collusive relationships between bureaucrats and intermediaries hide and perpetuate corruption, while giving the appearance of a transparent government that is responsive to civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • Abstract:
      Bastante bolivianos se involucran en la corrupción a través de intermediarios, como líderes de la sociedad civil y abogados, en vez de pagar funcionarios directamente. Ciudadanos no les gustan que los intermediarios agregan costos extras y opacidad a la corrupción, pero aún así eligen pagar coimas a través de intermediarios que se aprovechan de ellos. ¿Por qué los intermediarios de la sociedad civil facilitan la corrupción? Mientras otros estudios sobre intermediarios corruptos encuentran que los intermediarios reducen la incertidumbre y los costos de transacción, este estudio encuentra que los intermediarios participan en carteles de coimas, porque ayudan desproporcionadamente a los funcionarios y aumentan intencionalmente la incertidumbre y los costos para ciudadanos. Evidencia etnográfica original de los mercados populares de La Paz demuestra que los actores de la sociedad civil, como los líderes sindicales de los comerciantes populares, avanzan en sus carreras colectando y entregando coimas a funcionarios. Las relaciones colusorias entre los burócratas y los intermediarios de la sociedad civil ocultan y perpetúan la corrupción. Al mismo tiempo, les dan la apariencia de un gobierno transparente que responde a la sociedad civil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • Abstract:
      Copyright of Latin American Research Review is the property of Latin American Studies Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
    • ISSN:
      0023-8791
    • Accession Number:
      10.25222/larr.342
    • Accession Number:
      130207060
  • Citations
    • ABNT:
      HUMMEL, C. Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets. Latin American Research Review, [s. l.], v. 53, n. 2, p. 217–230, 2018. Disponível em: . Acesso em: 21 ago. 2019.
    • AMA:
      Hummel C. Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets. Latin American Research Review. 2018;53(2):217-230. doi:10.25222/larr.342.
    • APA:
      Hummel, C. (2018). Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets. Latin American Research Review, 53(2), 217–230. https://doi.org/10.25222/larr.342
    • Chicago/Turabian: Author-Date:
      Hummel, Calla. 2018. “Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets.” Latin American Research Review 53 (2): 217–30. doi:10.25222/larr.342.
    • Harvard:
      Hummel, C. (2018) ‘Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets’, Latin American Research Review, 53(2), pp. 217–230. doi: 10.25222/larr.342.
    • Harvard: Australian:
      Hummel, C 2018, ‘Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets’, Latin American Research Review, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 217–230, viewed 21 August 2019, .
    • MLA:
      Hummel, Calla. “Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets.” Latin American Research Review, vol. 53, no. 2, Apr. 2018, pp. 217–230. EBSCOhost, doi:10.25222/larr.342.
    • Chicago/Turabian: Humanities:
      Hummel, Calla. “Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets.” Latin American Research Review 53, no. 2 (April 2018): 217–30. doi:10.25222/larr.342.
    • Vancouver/ICMJE:
      Hummel C. Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets. Latin American Research Review [Internet]. 2018 Apr [cited 2019 Aug 21];53(2):217–30. Available from: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=mth&AN=130207060