Constitutional Foundations of Military Coups.

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  • Author(s): Aydogan, Abdullah
  • Source:
    Political Science Quarterly (Oxford University Press / USA). Spring2019, Vol. 134 Issue 1, p85-116. 32p.
  • Additional Information
    • Subject Terms:
      COUPS d'etat; ARMED Forces in politics; MILITARY strategy; INCOME inequality; CIVIL-military relations; MILITARY government; WAR
    • Subject Terms:
      EGYPT; TURKEY
    • Abstract:
      The article discusses how a specific set of institutions influence the decisions of the military coups considering the degree and form of intervention in political processes. Topics include the existing studies on military coups which provide arguments on the potential determinants of coups including income inequality, income growth, and military centrality, the consensus met by the civil-military relations literature on the target of military coups in determining the concept, and the cases of conflict in Egypt and Turkey from the impact of constitutional design on the probability of coups.