The Decision Zone: The New Stage of Interrogation Created by Berghuis v. Thompkins.

POLICE questioning -- Law & legislation; BERGHUIS v. Thompkins; MIRANDA rights; FALSE confession; POLICE; UNITED States. Supreme Court; CONSTITUTIONAL law

This Article addresses a new stage of interrogation, approved of for the first time in the Supreme Court's 2010 decision, Berghuis v. Thompkins. This stage--the "decision zone"--is the period, however brief or prolonged, after officers have read a suspect his rights but before the suspect has decided whether to waive or to invoke those rights. In Thompkins, the Supreme Court allowed interrogation during this stage, which lasted almost three hours in that case. In Thompkins, the Supreme Court implicitly assented to prolonged interrogation before a suspect decides whether to invoke or to waive his rights, thus creating the decision zone. This Article argues that existing precedents regarding trickery in interrogations address police behaviors only before a suspect is read his rights or after he has waived his rights and agreed to talk to police. These precedents do not directly address trickery in the decision zone. Such precedents are, in fact, overbroad when applied to interrogation in the decision zone because this interim period is the crucial time in which a suspect is deciding whether or not to waive his rights. Courts must look at the constitutionality of police trickery during this period as a new question not controlled by existing precedents. Under Maryland v. Seibert, police officers may not intentionally undermine the effectiveness of Miranda warnings. This Article argues that trickery in the decision zone may be barred by Seibert and other precedents in certain instances. This Article proposes a two-factor test for deciding when trickery in the decision zone should be found unconstitutional. First, a court must ask whether a given police practice has the intent and effect of undermining Miranda warnings. Second, the court must ask whether the police practice has a tendency to produce false confessions. These factors, rather than existing precedents regarding trickery in interrogations, should control the new constitutional inquiry into police behavior within the decision zone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of American Journal of Criminal Law is the property of University of Texas at Austin School of Law Publications and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)