NÕUKOGUDE FAKTORIST EESTI 12. MÄRTSI 1934. AASTA RIIGIPÖÖRDES. (Estonian)

THE SOVIET FACTOR IN THE 12 MARCH 1934 COUP D'ÉTAT IN ESTONIA. (English)

ESTONIA; SOVIET Union

The article examines the role played by the Soviet Union in the coup d'état that took place in Estonia on 12 March 1934. The following questions are dealt with: What was the Soviet Union's attitude toward the Estonian political parties in 1933 and at the beginning of 1934? What were the foreign policy views of the veterans of the War of Independence (vabaduss6jalased)? How did the Soviet Union try to help Konstantin Päts to remain in power? Did tee planners of the coup d'état attempt to discover what the Soviet Union's response to the coup would be? Did Moscow's orders for Estonian goods play any role in the execution of the coup? Was Moscow cognizant of the coup? And, finally: What did the legations of Germany, Poland and England know about the possibility of a coup d'état? The years 1933-1934 were tense and complex in both the domestic and foreign policy arenas in Estonia. In domestic policy this was evidenced by the constitutional crisis, the discontent of the populace because of the economic crisis and, certainly, in the battle of the various political groupings over power. But it was certainly also evidenced by the assiduous attempts of the Soviet Union, Germany and Poland to exert influence on the domestic policies of the Baltic States. One object of study is the claim of historiographers that from Moscow's viewpoint it made no difference who became the president of Estonia, that is the domestic policy fight in Estonia was of no vital importance to the Soviet Union. The assertion of historiographers that, from Moscow's point of view, it was desirable that Päts should become president but that there was no great difference between him and the other candidates proves to be untrue. Similarly, the assertion that for the Soviet Union the internal political battles in Estonia were not of great importance is not acceptable. It is true on a global scale but on the Baltic or East European scale these were indeed considered to be very important. The 1933 reports of the Soviet legation in Tallinn as well as the instructions from the Peoples' Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the legation continuously emphasized that while the coming to power of the right wingers could not be avoided, this development would be most undesirable for relations between the Soviet Union and the Baltic States. For an explanation as to why the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs found it necessary to support Päts in the Estonian presidential elections one must point first of all to his former ties to the Soviet legation and trade delegation. No other Estonian leading political figures or higher government officials of the time had, during the 1924-1934 period, such special relations with the Soviet legation in Tallinn. In 1933 the Soviet Union feared that, should the right wingers come to power, Estonia would orient its foreign policy toward Germany and this would, in turn, influence the behaviour of the neighbouring countries and that an anti-Soviet bloc under the aegis of Germany and Poland would develop at the western border of the Soviet Union. Among the most important tools used by the Soviet Union to support the government of the Head of State Päts, who came to power in October 1933, can be considered the additional orders for goods given to Estonia. The correspondence between the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the legation in Tallinn and Comintern documents reveal a special desire to influence Estonia's internal policy in a direction desirable for the Soviet Union in 1933 and at the beginning of 1934. This can be considered as unprecedented. At the same time it is impossible to establish a valid yardstick for assessing how much the support of the Soviet Union in 1933-1934 influenced Head of State Päts to carry out the coup d'état. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On vaadeldud, milline oli Nõukogude Liidu roll Eestis 12. märtsil 1934 toimunud riigipöördes. Vaatluse all on järgmised küsimused: kuidas suhtus Nõukogude Liit 1933. aastal ja 1934. aasta algul Eesti erakondadesse? missugused olid vabadussõjalaste välispoliitilised vaated? kuidas püüdis Nõukogude Liit Pätsi võimulejäämist toetada? kas riigipöörde kavandajad üritasid teada saada Nõukogude Liidu võimalikku suhtumist riigipöördesse? kas Moskva tellimused Eesti kaupade ostmiseks võisid riigipöörde läbiviimisel mingit rolli mängida? kas Moskva oli riigipöördega kursis? mida teadsid Tallinnas asunud Saksa, Poola ja Inglise saatkond riigipöörde võimalikkusest? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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