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Las preferencias ciudadanas hacia alternativas de política fiscal en Estados descentralizados: armonización tributaria y competencia fiscal en España.
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- Author(s): Martínez-Vázquez, Jorge1 ; Sanz-Arcega, Eduardo2 ; Manuel Tránchez-Martín, José3
- Source:
Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Apr-Jun2024, Issue 186, p103-122. 20p. - Source:
- Additional Information
- Alternate Title: Detecting Citizens’ Preferences for tax Policy Choices in Decentralized Settings: Subnational Tax Harmonization and Race to the Bottom in Spain.
- Subject Terms:
- Subject Terms:
- Abstract: The eventual disconnection between voters´ preferences and specific policies is of special concern in decentralized countries, where any policy initiative might be simultaneously seen either as an erosion or a reinforcement of selfrule. The aim of this paper is to apply this framework to the harmonization of the Spanish Inheritance and Gift Tax (IGT). We econometrically contrast whether citizens´ living in Autonomous Communities (ACs) that led a tax race to the bottom regarding this tax or in those that exert a greater taste for political autonomy are more likely to oppose a more nationally uniform tax than the rest of Spaniards. Empirically, we exploit data from the 2019 wave of the Institute for Fiscal Studies Fiscal Barometer. According to our main results, citizens living in low taxation ACs and citizens living in some more pro-self-rule regions are even more likely to favor harmonization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Abstract: La eventual desconexión entre las preferencias de los votantes y las políticas concretas es de especial interés en Estados descentralizados, donde cualquier iniciativa política también puede verse como una erosión o un refuerzo del autogobierno. El objetivo de este artículo es aplicar este marco conceptual a la armonización del Impuesto sobre Sucesiones y Donaciones español (ISD), contrastando econométricamente si los ciudadanos que viven en comunidades autónomas que lideraron una carrera fiscal a la baja en este impuesto o en aquéllas más proclives al autogobierno se oponen en mayor medida que el resto de españoles a la armonización tributaria de este impuesto. Empíricamente, explotamos los datos del Barómetro Fiscal de 2019 del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Según nuestros principales resultados, los ciudadanos que viven en comunidades autónomas con un menor ISD y los ciudadanos que viven en algunas regiones donde gobiernan partidos nacionalistas tienen incluso más probabilidades de favorecer la armonización. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Abstract: Copyright of Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas is the property of Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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